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IRAQ’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS AND THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ETHNO-SECTARIANISM
Jomana Qaddour*
ABSTRACT
What role did Iraq's ethno-sectarian cleavages play in the process of
drafting its 2005 Constitution? And what role has that Constitution played in
further entrenching those cleavages? The 2003 Iraqi invasion by U.S. and allied
forces ultimately resulted in the drafting of two of the country's most important
documents: the Transitional Administrative Law and the 2005 Constitution.
These two documents—heavily influenced by the United States and Britain, as
well as powerful Iraqi stakeholders (both local and exiled)—were approved
despite their serious deficiencies, particularly in articles pertaining to power
sharing, individual rights, and civil liberties. These deficiencies, some of which
were inspired by ethno-sectarian cleavages, resulted in a constitution that has
since fueled further turmoil in Iraq. Given the wave of new constitutions being
drafted across the Arab world, this Article examines one of the Middle East's
most pivotal constitutional processes. Lessons can be extracted for future
constitutional processes, especially in diversely populated countries. Crucially,
this Article dissects the ethnno-sectarian bargaining that transpired between the
many stakeholders in drafting the Constitution, resulting in a document that has
set Iraq on an undemocratic trajectory ever since.
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INTRODUCTION
In October 2019, the world witnessed massive waves of protests in Iraq;
across televisions all over the world, protesters—not for the first time—could be
seen taking to the streets, demanding an end to the rampant corruption, lack of
basic services, and unresponsive politicians. The Iraqi Human Rights
Commission estimates that from October 2019 through July 2020, at least 550
Iraqis were killed during these protests.1 And while the reality of COVID-19
coupled with state-led crackdowns has forced many of the protesters to go home,
members of parliament—generally removed from the pulse on the ground and
the needs of Iraqi citizens—doubled down on blaming parties other than their
own for stagnation and avoided any discussion of corruption and
misgovernment, a main source of Iraqi frustration.2

1
Nearly 550 Killed in Iraq Protest Violence: Commission, FRANCE24 (July 2, 2020), https://www.
france24.com/en/20200207-nearly-550-killed-in-iraq-protest-violence-commission.
2
Telephone Interview with Zaid Al-Ali, Iraqi Constitutional Scholar (May 12, 2020).
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Over sixty percent of Iraqis are under the age of twenty-five:3 they have
grown up in a largely war-torn and corrupt society, and according to experts, at
least ninety percent of the protests are made up of students and new college
graduates.4 Most strikingly, southern Iraq, and particularly Basra—a location
deemed Iraq’s oil hub and largely made up of Iraq’s majority Shia sect—is
incredibly vocal in its rejection of Iraq’s current state.5 But this is not the first
time Shia protestors have mobilized against a Shia-led government.6 Indeed,
contrary to what many observers may think, the newest wave of protests
reinforces the reality that Iraq’s problems are not centered around sectarian
struggles for power, even though political rhetoric and political parties, as well
as Iraq’s constitution, have been designed to exploit such cleavages. In addition
to calls to address high unemployment, lack of security, and ineffective
governing institutions, there have been calls to amend, and in some cases totally
re-write, the constitution which protestors appropriately consider lacking in
legitimacy and contributing to much of the chaos seen in Iraq today.7 These
justified complaints come from all sects and ethnicities.
In the minds of most people, the 2003 invasion is singled out as the moment
when sectarianism broke out in Iraq. As Iraqi scholar Fanar Haddad points out,
“if we restrict our understanding of ‘sectarianism’ solely to violent sectarian
conflict, widespread sectarian hatred, and the empowerment of sect-centric
political actors, then 2003 undoubtedly becomes the moment separating
‘sectarian’ Iraq from a ‘non-sectarian’ one.”8 However, expanding the definition
of sectarianism to include “sect-centric bias, prejudice, stereotypes, and
institutional discrimination,” Fanar argues, would mean “sectarianism in
Iraq . . . was alive and well long before 2003.”9

3
In Iraq, UN Youth Envoy Says Young People Are ‘Most Valuable Force We Have to Shape a Better
Future’, UNITED NATIONS (Aug. 12, 2017), https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/08/in-iraqun-youth-envoy-says-young-people-are-most-valuable-force-we-have-to-shape-a-better-future.
4
Telephone Interview with Rasha al-Aqeedi, Iraqi Expert (Feb. 25, 2020).
5
Months of Protests Roil Iraq’s Oil Capital Basra, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.npr.
org/2018/09/27/651508389/months-of-protests-roil-iraqs-oil-capital-basra.
6
Renad Mansour & Ben Robin-D’Cruz, The Basra Blueprint and the Future of Protests in Iraq,
CHATHAM HOUSE (Oct. 8, 2019), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/basra-blueprint-and-futureprotest-iraq.
7
Marsin Alshamary & Safwan Al-Almin, Iraqi Protesters Demand Constitutional Change. Can They
Make It Happen?, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/07/iraqiprotesters-demand-constitutional-change-can-they-make-it-happen.
8
Fanar Haddad, Sectarian Relations Before “Sectarianization” in pre-2003 Iraq, in SECTARIANIZATION:
MAPPING THE NEW POLITICS OF THE MIDDLE EAST 101, 105 (Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel eds., 2017).
9
Id.

QADDOUR_7.11.22

240

7/11/2022 9:49 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Those without knowledge of Iraq’s history are unaware of the root causes of
the sectarianism seen in its society today. Without such knowledge, it is difficult
to address the institutionalization of societal cleavages, and even more difficult
to develop solutions to address them. To correctly understand which events led
Iraq to the place it is today, one must come to grips with the impact of the past
and current legal framework—specifically the Iraqi constitution—on
institutionalizing Iraq’s sectarian elements. It is only in this way that appropriate
recommendations can be made on how to move Iraq forward from its state of
turmoil to a more sustainable, stable, and peaceful state.
This Article attempts to review Iraq’s constitutional history and highlight the
role it has played in solidifying the seeds of division which tear the country apart
today. This Article begins by reviewing the most critical historical moments in
Iraq’s history which laid the seeds for solidifying sectarianism in society. It then
addresses the role of constitutionalism in non-democratic societies. Next, this
Article discusses the relevant constitutional history and institutionalized
sectarian cleavages that are seen today, with a particular focus on two categories
of articles in the constitution: power sharing and civil rights and liberties articles.
The Article ends with thoughts on how Iraq can move forward from here.
I.

IRAQ IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

To understand today’s Iraq, it is important to understand its history. An
appropriate starting point is the reign of the Ottoman Empire. Like other
European empires, interaction between the subject and the state was limited,
with “the collection of taxes being its most important contact with the
population.”10 The state’s function largely focused on the provision of basic
security to its constituents.11
Neither the Ottomans Empire nor Europeans embraced liberal
constitutionalism until the advent of the modern nation-state; in that respect they
were the same. However, they departed on one critical issue. As a result of the
Enlightenment and the French Revolution, a universal “assumption of human
reason, rational thought and the sovereignty of each individual” arose in Europe
but remained absent in the Ottoman Empire’s culture.12 Although in the period
immediately following the Enlightenment, democratic principles remained the
exception rather than the norm in Europe; the governor—rather than the
10
Thomas Philipp, From Rule of Law to Constitutionalism, in ARABIC THOUGHT BEYOND THE LIBERAL
AGE 142, 147 (Jens Hanssen & Max Weiss eds., 2017).
11
Id. at 146.
12
Id.
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governed—remained the source of legislative authority.13 Meanwhile, Islam
remained the Ottoman Empire’s source of legitimacy; the Sultan served as
“God’s Shadow on Earth.”14 The Empire’s conservative political-legal culture
developed no legal code as an alternative to Islamic law (sharia).15 The Sultan
issued laws supplementing sharia which “were ad hoc and neither inclusive nor
complete, nor permanent[.]”16 But supplementing laws did not constitute a
definite legal code or political tradition. This existence of two sources of law—
Islamic law and laws emanating from the political executive, i.e., the Sultan—
was a result of functionality, and was not intended to create the semblance of
separation of powers.17
Given that the Empire viewed subjects primarily through their tax status,
which was determined by religious affiliation, an individual’s religious identity
became crucial in any interaction between the individual and the state.18 While
the Ottoman Empire was committed to the notion of “Ottoman Muslim
supremacy,” it reigned over a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian, and multi-religious
empire.19 The Ottomans employed the millet system of taxation, which
“reinforced the emphasis on religion in a profoundly unequal and political order”
by prioritizing Muslims and giving dhimmis (non-Muslims) a separate status.20
It imposed jizyah (taxes) upon non-Muslims, and applied laws to them which
differed from the laws imposed on Muslim populations.21 Muslims were
prioritized in the Empire, and the outcome of the Ottoman management of its
diverse subjects was coexistence, not equality, of diverse religious
communities.22
This millet system remained intact until the tanzimat (reforms) of 1839.23
Under the Noble Edict of the Rose Chamber, new institutions were established
mandating the security of life, honor, and property for all subjects of the Empire

13

Id.
Ussama Makdisi, The Problem of Sectarianism in the Middle East in an Age of Western Hegemony, in
SECTARIANIZATION, supra note 8, at 23, 26.
15
Id. at 147.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Philipp, supra note 10, at 147.
19
Id.
20
Makdisi, supra note 14, at 26.
21
Id. at 27.
22
It is helpful to note that during the Empire rule, modern day Iraq was divided into three provinces,
Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. The borders of each province were more or less drawn according to where Iraq’s
major ethno-sectarian groups resided (Kurds, Sunnis, and Shia respectively). Id.
23
Tanzimat, BRITANNICA (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Tanzimat.
14

QADDOUR_7.11.22

242

7/11/2022 9:49 AM

EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

regardless of race and religion.24 These reforms came about following the
increased trade and economic relationships between Europe and the Ottoman
Empire.25 The Empire felt increasing pressure to implement reforms to protect
themselves from the threat of political and military intervention by European
powers as trade relationships increased.26 By 1855, the jizya on dhimmis was
formally abolished, and in 1869 the concept of secular Ottoman citizenship was
introduced.27 The equality of subjects was temporarily enshrined in the
constitution in 1876, but then quickly withdrawn. It did not return until the
Young Turk movement in 1908—which itself adhered to these principles in
theory more than practice.28
The Empire’s short-lived attempt to impose equality of citizenship did not
settle well with the Muslim-majority population across its territories. The new
policy of “non-discrimination” disrupted the centuries-old system which
enshrined Muslim legal supremacy, leading to sectarian clashes.29 Its “top-down
disestablishment of a system of symbolic and legal Muslim supremacy” (without
preparing its elite or subjects for the changes) spurred resentment within a
Muslim majority.30 This system created an impression that the community was
making compromises to non-Muslim groups backed by hostile foreign powers
which wanted to see the demise of the Empire.31
As a result, sectarian clashes could be seen across the Empire. In Aleppo in
1850, there was a massacre of Christians where several churches were burned
and hundreds of Christian homes were destroyed and looted.32 A decade later,
another mob similarly turned against Damascene Christians.33 This uptick in
violence against non-Muslim minorities prompted interested European powers
to intervene—both to stop the violence against communities with which they felt
a religious affinity, and to simultaneously promote their more mundane interests.

24

Id.
See E. Durangolu & G. Okutucu, Economic Reasons Behind the Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 3610
NHH MASTER THESIS 2 (2009).
26
DAVID FROMKIN, A PEACE TO END ALL PEACE: THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE
CREATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST 28–29 (2001).
27
Makdisi, supra note 14, at 27.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 28.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 27.
33
Id.
25
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One critical sectarian clash was the 1860 conflict of Lebanon between the
Druze overlords and Maronite Catholic Christian peasants.34 The Ottomans
sided against the Maronites, spurring France—then ruled by Napoleon III, and
which viewed itself as a protector of the Levant’s Catholics—to directly
intervene.35 French intervention led to a series of conventions dubbed the
“Organic Regulation,’’ which took place between 1861 and 1864.36 The Organic
Regulation ultimately leading to the autonomy of the Mount Lebanon
Mutasarrifate in 1861 and the appointment of an Armenian Christian governor.37
This divided the council seats under the governor by sect: twelve members, of
them, four Maronites, three Druze, three Greek Orthodox and Greek Uniates,
one Sunni and one Shia.38 By making these concessions, the Empire formally
institutionalized top-down, sectarian quotas as a show of commitment to nondiscrimination against non-Muslims.39 This was seen by Europeans as the only
way to ensure religious pluralism and also served as a method of expanding
European influence.40 Minorities seized upon this moment and also pushed the
Europeans to help them create their own statelets: in Lebanon, the Maronitedominated statelet was created; Syria was carved into Alawite, Druze, and Arab
states, based on the geographical location of these groups, with the cooperation
of local leadership.41 Simultaneously, Europeans spurred the creation of
previously nonexistent religious positions, including elevating the mufti of
Beirut to represent of Sunnis in Lebanon, and creating the Supreme Muslim
Council in Palestine.42 Ottoman-era personal status laws (which were applied
based on sect) were welcomed and expanded during the mandatory period.43
Iraq fell under the British Mandate in 1918 (referred to as the Mandate for
Mesopotamia), during which the British High Commission became the only
legislative and executive authority in the country.44 The Iraq the Commission
took control of was one with great diversity and a multitude of languages:
34

Id.
Id. at 28, 32.
36
See 2 STANFORD J. SHAW & EZEL KURAL SHAW, HISTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND MODERN
TURKEY 142–44 (1977).
37
Id.
38
Bassel Salloukh, The Architecture of Sectarianization in Lebanon, in SECTARIANIZATION, supra note
8, at 215–16.
39
Makdisi, supra note 14, at 29.
40
Id. at 29.
41
Id. at 29.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Saad Jawad, The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and Political Implications, LON. SCH. ECON. 3
(Nov. 2013), http://www.constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/the_iraqi_constitution-structural_flaws_and_political_
implications.pdf.
35
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Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, Chaldean, Farsi, and others.45 However, it was also
deeply impoverished, underdeveloped, and money and influence were confined
in the hands of a very few elites.46 In rural areas, tribal and traditional norms
superseded government authority.47 Under the Mandate, the British did not seek
to radically alter the fabric of Iraqi society or impose new hierarchies. The
Ottomans had allowed local populations to more or less regulate the local affairs
of men—regardless of religion—among and between one another.48 This
continued to evolve and paved the way for Arab nationalist movements to take
root during the Mandate period.49 Meanwhile, the British focused on their
limited objectives based around the interests of the Kingdom: to shepherd the
mandates which would become future allies to independence; to ensure access
to crucial trade routes (both land and water); and to maintain the land route to
India. They were also assigned to keep competing powers, namely the French,
out of the region. Shortly after falling under the Mandate, the Great Iraqi
Revolution broke out in May 1920, bringing together nationalists who pushed
back on British rule.50 Although the rebellion failed, it had a lasting impact on
the way the British oversaw Iraq, feeling “compelled to shift their strategy in
favor of ruling indirectly, through a weak Iraqi administration.”51 In 1921, the
British selected Faisal bin Hussein as the King of the constitutional monarchy
of Iraq.52 The Iraqi provisional authorities, led by Abdelrahman al-Gillani,
negotiated a treaty of alliance with Britain, known as the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.53
The treaty codified several requirements: the King must consult with the British
High Commissioner on Iraq’s financial policy; the British are given access to
Iraq’s air bases; and the British can place civilian and military advisers all across
the state.54 The King’s elite mostly consisted of Sunni Arabs, with little effort to
include the rest of Iraq’s populations, although during his period the Kurds did
push for autonomy on language, cultural, and educational issues—demands
which were mostly ignored.55 A number of rebellions against the monarch

45
ZAID AL-ALI, THE STRUGGLE FOR IRAQ’S FUTURE: HOW CORRUPTION, INCOMPETENCE AND
SECTARIANISM HAVE UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY 18, 20 (2014).
46
Id. at 18.
47
Id.
48
Makdisi, supra note 14, at 30. Personal status and gender laws remained deeply problematic and
disadvantageous towards women. Id.
49
Id.
50
Al-Ali, supra note 45, at 19.
51
Id. at 19.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 20.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 21.
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during this time period were also quashed by the United Kingdom’s Royal
Air Force.56
In 1932, the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq gained independence from the
British.57 The British-friendly monarchy58 ruled until 1958, when it was deposed
in a violent coup led by General Abdel Karim Qasim.59 Around this time, Iraq’s
oil revenues increased, and the country saw the first robust investments in
education, infrastructure, manufacturing, and health care. A middle class was
finally created, lasting for another three decades.60 Tribal courts and the use of
tribal law were abolished.61
Although a contemporary of Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, Qasim was not a
pan-Arabist in the traditional sense and, in fact, was more West-leaning than
most Arab leaders.62 Like Iraqi monarchists before him, he believed in Arab
unity confined to specific areas of cooperation, such as foreign affairs, defense,
and education, but not others.63 He was alarmed by the proclamation of the
United Arab Republic by the Syrians and the Egyptians.64 He pushed back at the
time, as did other West-leaning countries, such as Jordan and Lebanon.65
Although Qasim’s rule oversaw some progress in Iraq’s development,
eventually his leadership became authoritarian, allocating legislative and
executive power exclusively to him, with no real power left for the parliament.66
He completely monopolized power and authority in Iraq.67
In February 1963, a coup organized by the Baath government removed
Qasim and took control.68 The Revolutionary Command Council, unelected and
unaccountable individuals, came to power and defined themselves in the
constitution as a “revolutionary body that led the people and national armed
forces . . . to overthrow the regime of . . . Qasim . . . in the name of and for the
56

Id. at 21.
COURTNEY HUNT, THE HISTORY OF IRAQ 69 (2005).
58
The monarchy had signed the Portsmouth Treaty, a military alliance with Great Britain in 1948. The
agreement was later cancelled, but only after a series of violent protests and scores killed by police. Juan Romero,
Arab Nationalist Constitutions of 1958 in the Context of the Cold War: The Cases of Egyptian-Syrian United
Arab Republic, the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union, and the Republic of Iraq, 56 MIDDLE E. STUD. 585, 594 (2020).
59
AL-ALI, supra note 45, at 25.
60
Id.
61
Id. at 26.
62
Romero, supra note 58, at 586.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 595.
65
Id.
66
AL-ALI, supra note 45, at 26.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 27.
57
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benefit of the people.”69 The Council went on to endow itself with full executive
and legislative authority.70 They were led by Arab nationalist and Qasim’s
second in command, Abdelsalaam Mohammed ʿArif al-Jumayli, who became
president in February 1963.71 He arrested officers who tried to depose him,
including Saddam Hussein.72 He joined the Joint Presidency Council with Egypt
in 1964 and went on to establish the Arab Socialist Union of Iraq that same
year.73 After he was killed in a helicopter crash in April 1966, his weaker brother,
Abdelrahman ‘Arif al-Jumayli, survived him as president from 1966 until
1968.74
The year 1968 saw the rise of the Arab Socialist Baathist Party, a system that
blended the notions of socialism with Arab nationalism, not too dissimilar from
what was witnessed in Syria and Egypt, yet still distinct. In the Iraqi context,
Arab unity was more focused on Iraq revolutionary nationalism than the panArab movements in Syria and Egypt.75 Iraq wanted to maintain its independence
and strength; it did not want to answer to other powers in the region. Like other
socialist powers in the region, however, it was generous in its provision of
welfare benefits to many citizens, including in the sectors of development,
education, and infrastructure.76 This came at the grave cost of personal
freedoms; even those granted some freedoms were bound to the state-created
framework and the image it sought to project to the outside world.
For the first ten years, Iraq was led by Saddam’s cousin, Ahmed Hassan alBakr, who had served as prime minister during the al-Jumayli years.77 Iraq
witnessed two additional provisional constitutions during this period: one in
1968 and the other in 1970.78 The 1970 Constitution remained in force until
2003, when Saddam Hussein was toppled.
The rise of the Iraqi nation-state in the post-mandate period, even during
Qasim’s time, was the first time Iraqi citizens felt any ownership over their
country; prior to this, the idea of citizenship, with rights of citizens and

69

Id. at 26.
Id. at 28.
71
Lawrence Joffe, Abdul-Rahman Aref, GUARDIAN (Sept. 3, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/news/
2007/sep/04/guardianobituaries.iraq.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Romero, supra note 58, at 586.
76
AL-ALI, supra note 45, at 25.
77
Id. at 28.
78
Jawad, supra note 44, at 3.
70
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obligations of the state, was virtually non-existent.79 But, the creation of this
nation also involved a reshaping of the notion of who an “Iraqi” would be:
although different from the Ottoman Empire, it again instituted the idea of
“insiders” and “outsiders,” solidifying and impacting communities
asymmetrically.80 The former religious and local rivalries began to interact with
the desire of the state to dominate the creation of a new national identity.81 A
competition began to develop in Iraq over who would define and determine
“national truths”: demographics, national history, national memory, and
entitlement within the state.82
Saddam came to power in the eventful year of 1979.83 The rise of the Islamic
Republic of Iran challenged the notion of Arab nationalism, and proposed a new
model for the region defined by the rise of an Islamic republic in the form of a
Shia-centric political model.84 The rise of Iran terrified the Arab Gulf States,
who feared that Iran’s revolution would sweep across the region.85 This fear
directly led to huge investments by the Arab states to fund anti-Shia messaging
across the Muslim world, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan.86 The tension
between Iran and Iraq reached its height during the eight-year Iran–Iraq War,87
in which the Gulf Arab countries backed Saddam Hussein in the battle against
Iran.88
During the peak of Iranian-Saudi rivalry, as Lebanese journalist Kim Ghattas
explains in Black Wave, Saddam seized the opportunity to crush any alternative
to his regime. Saddam targeted Kurds, whom he chased down—even crossing
into the Iranian border to do so—with air raids.89 He went after leftists and Shias,
the latter of which he expelled to Iran by the hundreds or put under house
arrest.90 Saddam remained wary of Shias, not exactly for sectarian reasons, but
79

Haddad, supra note 8, at 108–09.
Id. at 109–11. For example, the Nationality Law of 1924, and its restrictive Arabization policies, were
utilized to justify the authority’s use of repressive tactics to create a unified nation-state identity. Id. at 112.
81
Id. at 109.
82
Id.
83
Saddam Hussein, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saddam-Hussein (last visited
Sept. 12, 2021).
84
Haddad, supra note 8, at 115.
85
Nader Hashemi & Danny Postel, Introduction: The Sectarianization Thesis, in SECTARIANIZATION,
supra note 8, at 11.
86
Id.
87
Taking place from September 1980 until August 1988. Iran-Iraq War, BRITANNICA, https://www.
britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War (last visited Nov. 11, 2021).
88
Hashemi & Postel, supra note 85, at 81.
89
KIM GHATTAS, BLACK WAVE: SAUDI ARABIA, IRAN, AND THE FORTY-YEAR RIVALRY THAT
UNRAVELED CULTURE, RELIGION, AND COLLECTIVE MEMORY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 87 (2020).
90
Id.
80
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rather for the threat they posed to his power as the “oppressed majority,” whom
he claimed were backed by his rival Iran.91 In 1980, when there was an
assassination attempt on Iraqi Vice President Tariq Aziz, Saddam was quick to
blame Shia activists backed by Iran.92 In response, Saddam executed highprofile characters from the Shia community, including Ayatollah Mohammed
Baqer al-Sadr and his sister Amina bint al-Huda al-Sadr.93 Ayatollah al-Sadr was
the only cleric in Najaf who openly supported Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih.94 He was encouraging followers to rebel against
the Iraqi government and issued religious fatwas against joining the Baath
Party.95 His execution sparked a call to overthrow Saddam by Ayatollah
Khomeini, who had spent fourteen years in Najaf after he was exiled from Iran
by the Shah, only to be thrown out again by Saddam in 1978 at the behest of the
Shah.96
In August 1980, Saddam went to Saudi Arabia for a surprise twenty-fourhour visit to meet King Khaled in Taef, Saudi Arabia—his first foreign trip as
president.97 Shortly thereafter, on September 22, Saddam declared war on Iran.
The Iraq–Iran War galvanized the region to support either side: Jordan sent
volunteer fighters, and the Gulf loaned Saddam $14 billion for war efforts.98
Syria and the Amal Movement in Lebanon supported Iran.99 This war came as a
gift to Khomeini, who used it to solidify his support and unite Iranians against a
common enemy, and sent thousands of young Iranian men and boys to their
deaths.100 During the war, Khomeini was direct about his appeals to Iraq’s Shia;
he stated, “We are related by race, traditions, and religion . . . no other
government or nation in the world has the right to be concerned about Iraq’s
future.”101 The birth of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
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and an Iranian-based Iraqi government-in-exile came to fruition “with the
express goal of creating an Iranian-style Islamic republic.”102 The Iraq–Iran War
was viewed as the point of no return for two men, Saddam and Khomeini:
“[T]wo men with delusions of grandeur reaching into ancient Persian and Arab
history to justify their modern murderous campaigns.”103
On August 2, 1990, Saddam invaded and temporarily occupied Kuwait for
drilling on land that Saddam argued was Iraqi territory.104 This was a turning
point for Iraq and its relations with Western and Gulf countries which previously
had backed him against Iran. America turned against him, pushing the U.N.
Security Council to impose comprehensive sanctions on Iraq which remained in
place even after the U.S.-led coalition ousted Iraq from Kuwait.105 During the
brutal sanction years from 1990 until 2003, aggrieved Shia-sect-centric and
Kurdish dissidents led the opposition movement against Saddam’s regime. The
fact that they remained politically underrepresented under Saddam despite their
demographic weight only further fueled their “communal victimhood”
narrative.106 Iraqi expert Fanar Haddad argues the impact that marginalization
had on both Shias and Kurds in the Iraqi state amounted to “[m]ismanagement
of [c]ommunal [p]lurality.”107
Meanwhile, the breakdown in Sunni–Shia relations was actually the result
of state-versus-Shia tensions as opposed to communal Sunni–Shia tensions; Shia
groups pushed back against the state’s “homogenizing impulses,” not against
the greater Sunni community.108 In fact, it was not until the invasion of 2003 that
Sunnis galvanized behind their Sunni identity.109 Limits placed on public
expression of Shia identity were felt by some Shia communities on the ground
and further laid the foundation for grassroots Shia-centric mobilization against

102
Id. at 16–17. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) also formed military
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the state.110 While the government claimed to respect sectarian plurality,
identifying by sect was near criminalized and perceived as a threat to national
unity. Iraq was not alone in this regard: in many post-colonial states, in an effort
to build a strong united front against the enemy, the state often diluted minority
groups. Dissidents were seen as a “threat to national unity” or entities with
possible “dual loyalties.”111 Saddam’s paranoid autocratic rule monitored
anyone and everyone seen as a potential threat, and entire groups of people were
targeted on the basis of religious or ethnic background.112
During the invasion of 2003, the United States’ cooperation with specific
Iraqi opposition leaders further exacerbated the sect-centric model in the
country. The leading figures during the invasion were a cadre of exiles who
made the moral compromise to collaborate with the United States and the United
Kingdom to gain power. This defining characteristic ultimately went to the heart
of their legitimacy, creating a ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ situation, whereby
whatever they created was usually deemed inadmissible by average Iraqis. These
exiles were highly unqualified to oversee large projects, much less lead a country
they had not stepped into for decades and did not understand.113 The United
States’ coordination with a host of parties prior to the invasion via its Democratic
Principles Working Group114 meant the pre-planning of 2003 happened almost
exclusively with parties outside of Iraq which were either religious or sectarian,
and “bore little resemblance to Iraqi society.”115 These groups included the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),116 Ahmed Chalabi’s
Iraqi National Congress (INC), and Iyad Allawi’s Wifaq.117 Their isolation from
other Iraqis for decades, in part due to the atmosphere of extreme fear and
distrust cultivated by the Baathists, meant that “officials who took control of the
Iraqi state kept themselves to themselves, hardly interacted with each other, and
proceeded with extreme caution and distrust in dealing with anyone from a
different party.”118 As a result, as the gathering place for all of these exiles
became parliament, the institution itself “became the most sectarian institution
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in the country.”119 As positions were divided to reflect the “balance” of the
country, each ethno-sectarian grouping was given seats and influence based
upon what demographic weight each group was perceived to have.120
With this historical background, this Article will now turn to understanding
the purpose of Iraq’s constitution in today’s context, and then analyze Iraq’s
constitutional history.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM
Before delving into what Iraq’s constitutional weaknesses are, it is key to
understand why Iraq should have a constitution at all, and why constitutionalism
matters, even in non-democratic and/or illiberal societies.
Constitutionalism is the “legal limitation on government; it is the antithesis
of arbitrary rule; its opposite is despotic government, the government of will
instead of law.”121 While many scholars limit constitutionalism as a concept to
only being applicable to genuine democracies, culminating in what is referred to
as liberal constitutionalism, other scholars have argued for the need to
“pluraliz[e] the category of constitutionalism” so as to include governments that
are less than full-fledged democracies.122 This latter category of scholars believe
non-democratic countries can in fact be as stable as many democracies, and that
normative distinctions between regimes can and should be possible in order to
better predict legal outcomes.123
The idea here is that even in non-democratic regimes, one may find some
semblance of normative, thin constitutionalism which may be helpful in
understanding the place a constitution holds within the political structure.124
Extensive literature exists on bargaining in non-democratic settings; much of the
bargaining revolves around the need for a ruler to stabilize domestic settings
while maximizing the personal benefit of the ruler.125 Research shows
119
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authoritarians are more likely to create institutionalized regimes (often enshrined
in constitutions), which include the creation of legislatures and parties—even
those with limited decision-making power.126 This alleviates potential
opposition and creates a “conduit of information between the two sides” to
reduce “the potential for political instability.”127 Additional statistical analysis
reveals that the creation of state institutions “ha[s] a positive effect on economic
growth,” which of course is advantageous to a ruler who is the primary
beneficiary of this growth.128
Because Iraq is a system which operates on a balance of power between key
elites, there is no one power that has a total veto over which laws are ultimately
applied. The system is a result of many factors. The central government in Iraq
itself is weak and is in constant flux. Furthermore, it is dependent on a variety
of factors, including but not limited to international forces (the United States,
Iran, and Turkey); armed groups (Iraq, as will be discussed later, has four
different armies); and the political elite who dominate positions of power, many
of whom have been playing a game of musical chairs since 2003. This is not to
say there is no semblance of constitutionalism applied when it is advantageous
to do so. But overwhelmingly, selective constitutionalism is applied in Iraq—
particularly on issues of federalism and resources which depend mostly on
whether the balance-of-power equation is in the interest of the constructed and
loose elite bargain, or whether application of the law would instead produce no
clear winner.
It is important to recognize that constitutions, even deeply flawed ones,
should not be ignored. As in most undemocratic, unstable countries, the conflicts
in Iraq do not emanate from, and are certainly not confined to, Iraq’s
constitution. Reckless disregard for average citizens’ welfare, safety, health, and
rights is a major weakness of governance in Iraq. From this stems the political
elites’ theft of public funds, willful mismanagement of government institutions,
and prioritization of personal interests and influence above the needs of the state
and its citizens.
However, some of the very real troubles of Iraqis descend from
arrangements brokered by powerful, non-democratic stakeholders in the
constitutional ratification which have visible (and in some cases more hidden)
Authoritarianism in Syria, in MIDDLE EAST AUTHORITARIANISMS: GOVERNANCE, CONTESTATION, AND REGIME
RESILIENCE IN SYRIA AND IRAN 169 (2013).
126
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repercussions on the life of average Iraqis. The federalism articles, for example,
have been a constant source of violence, both for the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) and the rest of Iraq.129 The implications of resource
allocation according to the constitution have also been profound, resulting in the
halting of salaries of an arguably massive and bloated public sector.130 Even the
fact that the constitution recognizes by name only a portion of Iraq’s minorities
is symbolic for those communities, simultaneously alienating others. In other
words, even in fragile states with thin constitutionalism and no clear liberal
democratic system, constitutions do matter. Without a thorough understanding
of what problems in Iraq exist or were created by constitutional arrangements,
the constitution itself cannot be amended (or done away with), and calls for
reform will continue to fall on deaf ears.
A. Constitutional History Before 2005
Like many other countries in the Middle East, Iraq experienced a tumultuous
constitutional history following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. In 1925,
while still under the British Mandate, Iraq’s first constitution was drafted by an
elected Constituent Assembly.131 As mentioned previously, the British did not
attempt to radically alter cultural and historical elements of Iraq outside of what
impinged on British interests. As a result, the constitution under the British
Mandate added some classical liberal elements as an additional layer atop
traditions maintained under the Ottoman Empire, such as some elements of the
personal status laws and courts, which largely remained intact.132
The constitution of the Mandate years remained in full effect even post-Iraqi
independence and through King Faisal (I and II)’s reigns.133 In July 1958, a coup
d’état overthrew King Faisal, and a series of provisional constitutions were
drafted in the period after his removal.134 A total of five provisional constitutions
were produced in the following years: the 1958 constitution (following the
coup); the 1964 constitution (following another coup); two provisional
constitutions in 1968 (following another coup); and finally, the Constitution of
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1970, dubbed the “New Interim Constitution.”135 This 1970 “interim”
constitution remained in effect until the invasion of Iraq in April 2003.136
Briefly, the 1970 Constitution was in place during the reign of Ahmed
Hassan al-Bakr, and thereafter during the rule of Saddam Hussein. Like other
regional constitutions of Arab nationalist, socialist, secular, and authoritarian
regimes, the 1970 Constitution did not directly include sectarian language. Iraq’s
Baathist regime focused on forging a unified appearance in the face of the West,
despite the protest of various domestic movements which resented such a false
“unified” national identity. The primary objective of the Iraqi Arab nationalist
constitution was to create a predictable system which provided the regime with
exaggerated executive power in the name of stability. Indeed, at the time,
socialist ideologies in the form of welfare provisions and a forged national
identity, stability, and predictability were perceived as more necessary than
democracy—which, frankly, was not put forth as an option by the Ba’ath Party.
The mention of rights and civil liberties in the 1970 Constitution, especially
those directed at ethnicity or religion, is quite thin. Notable in the 1970
Constitution, Part I, Article 1 stated Iraq’s “principal aim [is] to fulfil the united
Arab State”, and Article 5 stated “Iraq is a part of the Arab nation.”137 These two
articles followed the trend in the Arab world at the time and heralded above all
the strong, paternalistic, Arab-nationalist state, with an agenda that intended to
overlook and make invisible the non-Arab nations which existed in the region.
Given that neither al-Bakr nor Hussein cared much about instrumentalizing
religion at the time, Article 4 stating “Islam is the religion of the State” dealt
with the ever-present debate over what role religion would play in the state
without much detail and was deemed sufficient by both leaders.138
In Part III of the constitution, under the section of Basic Rights and
Obligations, Article 19 obligated the state to treat citizens equally under the Law,
“without distinction for reason of race, origin language or social category or
religion.”139 Further, Article 25 guaranteed “[f]reedom of religions, beliefs and
exercise of religious ceremonies . . . that should not contradict the provisions of
Constitution or the Law and should not infringe the manners and the
publicorder.”140
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The 1970 Constitution initially did not articulate specific mention of a
power-sharing agreement with the Kurds. When the Baathists came to power,
they were keen to eliminate the chances of a coup and sought to bring an end to
the perpetual Kurdish guerrilla wars.141 An agreement was reached between the
Iraqi government and the main Kurdish party, Kurdistan Democratic Party, in
May 1970.142 The agreement stipulated that Kurds would have equal access to
employment; schools would be constructed in Kurdish areas; local
administrative offices would be staffed by Kurds or Kurdish-speaking
individuals.143 Further, where the government had exercised eminent domain
over property (mostly land with oil and gas, especially in Kirkuk), property
owners would be resettled and given “proper compensation.”144
This eventually culminated into a proper constitutional amendment in March
1974, which eventually set the stage for the creation of Iraq’s Kurdish
autonomous region seen today.145 In that brief amendment, Annex 2, Article 1
stated: “The area, whose majority of the population is from Kurds, shall enjoy
Autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the Law.”146 It did not take
long before it was clear that the Baathist Party had no intention of
operationalizing this amendment. Local authorities remained firmly under
central government control, the president still had the right to dissolve the
regional legislature, the central government was to approve all budgets, and
security forces answered only to the Ministry of Interior.147 As a result, this led
to the resumption of hostilities between Baghdad and the Kurdish-held areas in
the 1980s, and Saddam began to lose firm control over the areas in northwest
Iraq shortly thereafter.148
Although this amendment alone did not yield any tangible results for the
Kurds at the time, they used this to further galvanize support for de facto
independence in 1991, after Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait,149 with American
support.150 This would forever change the landscape for Iraq’s Kurds. The area
cultivated independent international relationships with the outside world (during
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the time of severe and blanket sanctions on Iraq),151 which paved the way for the
more formal delineation of the Kurdish areas—Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya,
Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninevah—to be referred to as the Kurdistan Regional
Government in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and the subsequent
2005 Constitution.152
III. THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003 changed the previous balance of
power in the country dramatically. Shortly after the invasion, from May 2003
until June 2004, U.S. Ambassador L. Paul Bremmer was placed as the head of
the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), becoming the Civil Administrator of
all of Iraq.153 His position gave him authority to legislate, although international
humanitarian law generally prohibits an occupier from modifying the occupied
country’s legal system, except to defend the occupier’s forces.154 U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1483(5), which lifted trade sanctions against Iraq but kept
the arms embargo, emphasized compliance with those obligations.155 However,
UNSCR 1483(8), adopted May 2003, assigned legal and governing duties to the
CPA instead of a sovereign Iraqi government:
Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for
Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve… working
intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others
concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and
local institutions for representative governance, including by working
together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally
recognized, representative government of Iraq.156

To meet the obligations of this resolution and establish representative
governance, the CPA, Paul Bremer, and British government officials appointed
twenty-five members to the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) to draft the TAL.157
The makeup of the IGC was largely drawn along openly sectarian lines, and
consisted of the following categories: eleven Shia religious party members; the
151

AL-ALI, supra note 45, at 36.
Art. 53(A), Law of the Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period of 2004.
153
al-Istrabadi, supra note 149, at 1633.
154
al-Istrabadi, supra note 131, at 270.
155
S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 8 (May 22, 2003). It calls upon all concerned to fully comply with their obligations
under international law including, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of
1907. Id.
156
Id. (emphasis added).
157
Toby Dodge & Renad Mansour, Sectarianization and De-Sectarianization in the Struggle for Iraq’s
Political Field, 18 REV. FAITH & INT. AFF. 1, 58, 61 (2020).
152

QADDOUR_7.11.22

2022]

7/11/2022 9:49 AM

IRAQ’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS

257

exiled Ahmed Chalabi (who also voted with the Shia parties); five Sunnis; one
Iraq Muslim Brotherhood member; five Kurds (one from the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK); one from Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP); and three
independents Kurds, although their vote mirrored the PUK and KDP votes); one
Christian; and one Turkman.158 The latter two were added because they had
strong support of external actors (the United States, United Kingdom, and
Turkey); all of Iraq’s other minorities were effectively sidelined. Such an
arrangement was characterized as representing “all the strands from Iraq’s
complicated social structure.”159 Still, despite this problematic and publicly
announced makeup of the IGC in November 2003, most of the critical
discussions did not take place among IGC members. Rather, much of the TAL’s
negotiations occurred behind closed doors between unaccountable parties and
involved bilateral compromises (primarily between the United States and other
parties, instead of agreements between Iraqi stakeholders).160 It came as no
surprise that the IGC unanimously approved the TAL for the transitional period
and subsequently signed it on March 8, 2004.161 Ambassador Bremer, who was
also required to consent to the agreement per the UNSCR 1483, put it into
force.162 An interim government, selected by the CPA and the United Nations
and led by Iyad Allawi (the CPA’s choice), assumed control on June 28, 2004,
at which point the CPA and IGC were dissolved.163
Transitionary constitutions (and even the subsequent, permanent 2005 Iraqi
constitution) are meant to embody the goal of “peacemaking . . . aimed at
responding to past injustices by providing a new liberal framework for the State.
. . . [T]ransitional constitutionalism uses the constitution as a tool to deliver
peace.”164 Scholars have argued that the premise of having a transformative
constitutional process, often following a conflict or revolution, is designed to
create a constitution that will:
provide a focal point around which the citizens of the state can unite,
representing the constitution of a nation. Through the liberal emphasis
on the guarantees of human rights and the rule of law, whereby power
is constrained within the new constitutional framework, it is intended
that the constitution will provide a unifying focal point for a previously
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fractured polity. The underlying premise is that the constitution can
replace politics with law, transcending political divisions with an
impartial legal framework.165

The reality was that the United States was eager to relieve itself of legal
responsibility in Iraq. The TAL and subsequent 2005 Constitution are reflective
of this being a primary, rushed goal, as opposed to the creation of a sustainable
system which replaced politics with law. While both documents did have
transformative roles in politics, their goal was not long-term stability couched in
international legal norms, nor enshrining equality through the “prosecution of
human rights abuses” and entrenching social and economic rights.166 Instead, the
notion of grievance politics, grievance competition, and power bargaining
among ineffective national leaders became the cornerstone of how rights,
resources, and power were divided across Iraq instead of being rooted in
international law.
Ultimately, the TAL’s importance lies in the fact that many contentious
articles within it set the stage for the 2005 Constitution which has been
scrutinized immensely since its passage, for reasons expounded upon below.
Understanding the background about what ultimately was or was not included
in the text, therefore, becomes crucial. While nothing formal mandated that the
TAL would serve as a “principle source” for drafting the constitution, in reality,
this was debatable. Senior U.S. officials publicly stated that they expected “the
TAL to be used as a ‘cornerstone’” for the drafting of the constitution and that
the “Iraq constitution [would] draw heavily from transitional law . . . .”167
A. Rights and Civil Liberties
The TAL is a sixty-two-article document which dives straight into rights and
protections starting in the preamble.168 The preamble also rejected the “previous
tyrannical regime” and vows to “establish the mechanisms aiming, amongst
other aims, to erase the effects of racist and sectarian politics and practices.”169
Article 7, the article found in almost every Arab country’s constitution,170
expanded the role of Islam in the state from what it was in the previous 1970
Constitution. It states:
165
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167
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170
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Islam is the official religion of the State and is to be considered a
source of legislation. No law that contradicts the universally agreed
tenants of Islam . . . may be enacted during the transitional period. This
Law respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people
and guarantees the full religious rights of all individuals to freedom of
religious belief and practice.171

This was the first step to inject religion into the Iraqi constitution, and heavy
debate transpired about whether the text would use the phrase “a source of
legislation,” “the source of legislation,” “a principle [sic] source amongst other
principle sources,” or other phrases.172 As expected, it was one of the most
contentious articles in the TAL. Because the IGC was not an elected body, this
factor ultimately played in favor of pushing back on the religious parties. The
IGC was able to argue that this was not an elected body and that it was not
drafting a final constitution, so details could be renegotiated later in a more
permanent document. The secular IGC members were able to convince religious
IGC members to keep Iraq’s historical language of declaring Islam as the official
state religion and declaring Islam “a source of legislation,” so long as other
language which prohibited laws that contradicted Islam would be added as
well.173
Article 9 declared both Arabic and Kurdish as official languages of Iraq and
also gave Iraqis the right to educate their children in their mother language,
including “Turcomen, Syriac, or Armenian in government educational
institutions in accordance with educational guidelines . . . .”174 Like the selective
make-up of the IGC, the inclusion of some languages was determined by who
had the support of strong backers, including the CPA; those who did not were
excluded.175 Chapter Four176 also employed similar language by singling out—
while simultaneously excluding—some of Iraq’s minorities.177 By ratifying this
article, however, Iraq became one of the first and only countries in the Middle
East to recognize more than one language as its official language, which is still
no minor accomplishment to this day.178
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Chapter Two in the TAL, regarded as its Bill of Rights, articulated the right
of anyone with Iraqi nationality to be an Iraqi citizen, with all the rights that
entails.179 Article 11(D)’s language is especially important: “Any Iraqi whose
Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial or sectarian
reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.”180 Members of the IGC
have stated that Article 11 was the most contentious article in Chapter Two
because of the implications this had on Iraqi expatriate Jews who had Israeli
citizenship. Article 11 would now restore their Iraqi citizenship.181 This was
indeed a major difference from how other Arab countries treated Jews that were
exiled and had Israeli (or other) citizenship.
The equal rights clause in Article 12 was also notable, as it was far more
comprehensive than most Western constitutions, and indeed more so than any
country in the region:
All Iraqis are equal in their rights without regard to gender, sect,
opinion, belief, nationality, religion, or origin, and they are equal
before the law. Discrimination against an Iraqi citizen on the basis of
his gender, nationality, religion, or origin is prohibited.182

Articles 31(B)(3) and 35(B)(3) discuss de-Baathification, a concept introduced
formally in the TAL and later codified in the 2005 Constitution.183 Dubbed “deSunnification” by some, it was an extended process designed to prevent any
Baathist members (which included membership from across Iraq’s sects) from
participating in the post-2003 government.184 De-Baathification is one of the
most controversial outcomes of the invasion because it “dismissed people based
on rank, not behavior.”185 This dismissal took place in the aftermath of a regime
which was widely understood to be run by one man’s will, not one party, despite
the impression that Saddam tried to give.186 There was also a lack of
understanding by outsiders about what party membership meant in the Iraqi
context. At the time of the regime’s fall, at least 400,000 were full party
members, of which 150,000 were civil service members and 250,000 served in
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the military, and party sympathizers across the country exceeded 1.2 million.187
But these numbers do not reflect actual supporters of Saddam or his policies.
Without Ba’ath party membership, one could not secure a civil servant position,
and so many opted to become Ba’ath party members solely for job security.188
Further, most criticism has been directed at the disbanding of the military,
specifically because of the superficial assessment by U.S. officials to do so on
ethno-sectarian terms: “[B]ecause the previous army had been dominated by
Sunni Arabs, Shia soldiers would never willingly follow their orders.”189 There
was little regard to the fact that most soldiers did not employ blind sectarian
hatred and that most, in fact, would have “welcomed an opportunity to resume
service, if only because that would have meant a regular income” at salaries
registering almost 100 times higher than during the sanction years.190
It is also important to note that de-Baathification preceded the TAL. Within
four days of Bremer’s arrival to Baghdad, he issued Orders 1 and 2.191 This
dissolved the party and all associated entities, most important of which was the
civil service, and set the stage for the state’s lustration policy to play out over
the next ten years.192 Various institutions carried out the vetting process,
beginning with the Higher National De-Baathification Commission (HNDC)
and later, the Higher National Commission for Accountability and Justice
(AJC).193 Both were led by Ahmed Chalabi, who pushed strongly for the
inception of the de-Baathification idea and oversaw its implementation for
several years, despite his clear conflict of interest as a candidate for office and
sitting government official.194 According to reviews of both the HNDC and AJC,
the organizations’ most high-ranking staff were Shia, which undermined the
appearance of objectivity, and while the institutions themselves had oversight
boards, they rarely met and did not exercise oversight in practice.195 Due process
and appellate review were almost non-existent.196 The process was perceived to
be a mostly politicized process, with the power to fire teachers, engineers, and
doctors who had never committed a crime in their life save being civil
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servants.197 Although there was pushback by key Iraqi figures to lustration—
namely from interim head of government Iyad Allawi, who saw this as a real
impediment to luring Sunnis to participate in the ongoing negotiations in 2004
and 2005—the Americans ultimately supported Chalabi’s pursuit of exBaathists.198
Beyond the general exclusion of Baathists from government service, there
were other, more detailed restrictions on individuals who participated in specific
crimes during the Saddam era. Article 35(B)(4) restricted anyone who
participated in the Anfal campaign of 1988, during which approximately 2000
Kurdish villages were wiped out and land mines were placed throughout the area
to discourage return, from gaining positions of power.199 Human Rights Watch
claims at least 50,000 Kurds were brutally murdered during this campaign.200
Article 35 also singled out those who committed crimes against the Iraqi
people during the 1991 intifada (uprising) that involved rebellions in both north
and south Iraq, mostly by Shia Arab Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, and leftist
groups, but was squashed brutally by Saddam and the Iraqi Republican Guard.201
Following the uprising, Saddam conducted a mass relocation of rebellious
populations and also drained the Mesopotamian marshes, in a clear move to
weaponize Iraq’s most precious resources.202
Finally, Chapter Four, which outlined the Transitional Legislative Authority
in Article 30(C), articulated “fair representation for all communities in Iraq,
including the Turcomans, ChaldoAssyrians, and others.”203 This section singled
out these two groups in a country with more than seven well-known religious
denominations (Yazidis, Sabean-Mandaeans, Baha’is, Zoroastrians, Buddhists,
Hindus, Jews, and adherents of folk religions),204 as well as several ethnic
minority groups (including Turkmen, Shabak, Chaldeans, Assyrians,
Armenians, Black Iraqis, and Roma)205 and thus is puzzling. Similarly, Article
53(D) “guarantee[d] the administrative, cultural, and political rights of the
197
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Turcomens, ChaldoAssyrians, and other citizens.”206 As mentioned earlier, in
interviews with constitutional scholars present at the time, the only explanation
given was that some groups were backed by the CPA and other actors in the
IGC, while others—those excluded—were not. This ultimately provided legal
preference for those two minority groups over others.207
B. Power Sharing
The new power-sharing structures in the TAL appear early in the document
and are expounded upon later in Chapter Three (which laid out the central
government’s authorities) as well as Chapter Eight (which focused on the
regional and provincial authorities).
From the outset, Article 4 articulated the new framework for Iraq’s political
structure, which would be, among many other things, a federal system “based
upon geographic and historical realities and the separation of powers, and not
upon origin, race, ethnicity, nationality, or confession.”208 It is important to note
that the struggle for decentralization and federalism is primarily rooted in almost
exclusive negotiations which took place between the two Kurdish parties and
the Americans. Although most Iraqis were concerned about the possibility of
creating yet another dictator in Baghdad who would oppress the whole state,
many Iraqis did not share the Kurdish vision of a federalist state system.209
The United States, through Bremer, initially pushed for a unified Iraq, with
a central government with a monopoly on resources, such as water and oil, as
well as on military force, with some devolved powers to the provinces.210
However, according to Peter Galbraith, lead advisor to the Kurds, this is not
what the Kurds were pushing for.211 They sought a loose federal system as close
to independence as possible.212 In fact, what they were pushing for was
federalism, where the “basic organizing unit of the country is the province or
state. The state or province is constituted first and then delegates certain powers
(of its choice) to the central government.”213
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The proposed Kurdish draft left monopoly over control of the KRG in the
hands of the KRG itself: laws passed by the Kurdish National Assembly would
be supreme and its elections would be conducted in parallel with the Iraqi
National Assembly.214 It would have its own military force (and any presence of
Iraqi military forces would require the Assembly’s approval), own its own land,
water, minerals, and oil, and would manage its future commercial oil fields and
keep the revenues.215 It is important to note that at the time of drafting the TAL,
there were no commercial oil fields currently operating within Kurdistan, but
this would give the KRG exclusive rights over any future commercial oil
fields.216 Only Kirkuk had existing commercial oil fields, which would remain
under Baghdad’s management.217 It is important to highlight that Kirkuk’s
status—both then and now—remains extremely controversial.218
Ultimately the language of the TAL did not deliver the expected outcome
for the Kurds, who walked back some of their demands for this phase of the state
building process.219 Bremer’s TAL gave the central government power over
water and oil resources, and there was no recognition of the Kurdish armed
force, the Peshmerga.220 However, Kurdistan would still remain an entity along
the borders recognized prior to the invasion.221 Kirkuk remained in flux, but the
TAL allowed displaced Kurds to return to Kirkuk, while Arabs in Kirkuk were
supposed to return to their place of origin, the latter of which was not
implemented.222 Despite what the TAL mandated, the Kurds nonetheless
ignored the document:223 they continued to apply their own constitution,
maintained the Peshmerga force, developed their own oil, and managed customs
along their border.224
The TAL ultimately articulated a short list of seven powers for the central
government in Article 25. These included the federal government’s control over
foreign policy and diplomatic representation;225 national security policy and
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maintaining armed forces to secure the country’s borders;226 as well as fiscal
policy, currency, customs, and the national budget.227 Baghdad would have no
authority over Iraq’s airspace, roads, railways, education, agriculture, or health
sector—those would be left in the hands of regions and provinces.228 Article
25(E) stated that Iraq’s resources belong
to all the people of all of the regions and governorates of Iraq . . . in
consultation with the governments of the regions and their
administration of the governorates, and distributing the revenues
resulting from their sale through the national budget in an equitable
manner proportional to the distribution of population throughout the
country, and with due regard for areas that were unjustly deprived of
these revenues by the previous regime, for dealing with their situation
in a positive way, for their needs, and for the development of the
different rest of the country.229

Iraq’s principal resources are oil and water. It one of the world’s top crude oil
producers,230 and both of the Middle East’s most important rivers, the Euphrates
and the Tigris, flow through Iraq.231 These resources are largely found outside
of the capital, in the provinces. While one-third of Iraq’s oil wealth is located in
the Kurdistan Regional Government, the remainder is located in the Shia
dominated south, including in Basra and Khor al–Amaya, two prominent port
cities.232

Article 53(A) of Chapter Eight focused on Regions, Governorates and
Municipalities.233 It officially created the KRG, and defined it as the
governorates of Dohuk, Erbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk,234 Diyala, and
226
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Ninevah.235 The TAL took what had been an exception in Iraq—one region
(the other tiers of government were all central government or provincial)—
and applied it as a general rule throughout the country.236 Article 53(C)
permitted the creation of more regions like the KRG, with the exception of
Kirkuk and Baghdad, which were not allowed to join any other region
(Baghdad is a region on its own).237 With regard to the rest of Iraq, regions
could be formed by three or more governorates, with a proper referendum of
the constituents in such governorates, followed by approval by the National
Assembly.238
The final article in the TAL worthy of mention, Article 58, reinserts Iraq’s
history into its future to “remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s
practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions . . . forcing
migration in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region,
depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting nationality.”239 The article goes
on to call out Saddam’s manipulation of administrative boundaries for political
ends and calls on the Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government
to make recommendations to the National Assembly to address those changes in
a permanent constitution.240 Like other sections of the TAL, this article is one
without operational authority and was included to appease or address aggrieved
communities, primarily the Kurds. What scholars like Zaid Al-Ali argue is that
there was never any political will in Baghdad, or institutional backing, to
operationalize it.241 Thus, it became another article of empty rhetoric in the TAL,
inserted to give the appearance of addressing grievances without actually doing
so.

expelled Kurds and began repopulating the area with Iraqi Arabs. Id. Although the Iraqi government controlled
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IV. IRAQ’S 2005 CONSTITUTION
A. Drafting
Before delving into the sections detailing power-sharing and civil liberties
in the 2005 permanent Iraqi constitution, it is important to highlight two
concerns about the constitutional drafting process that severely impacted the
drafting of the constitution from the outset. The first is the composition of the
committee, and the second is the tight timeline which prevented adequate
discussion and genuine compromise on the text.

1. Composition of the Committee
The composition of the constitutional committee, while made up of
representatives who won the January 2005 elections, was problematic. This was
due to the fact that the committee initially included a very limited number of
Sunnis (because of their boycott), and other smaller ethnic and religious groups
who did not win sufficient seats to be represented on the committee. Further, it
has since been discovered that the final draft of the constitution was actually
produced by small, elite parties which did not represent more than twenty
percent of Iraqi public opinion—an issue expounded upon later.242
From the time the TAL went into force in March 2004 until December 2004,
an insurgency in Iraq was in full swing. National Assembly elections held in
January 2005 were boycotted by the majority of the Arab Sunni population. In
the Sunni-dominated Anbar province, only two percent of registered voters
showed up at the polls; however, Sunni inclusion in the constitutional process
was only addressed much later.243 Shia parties, including the influential Shia
United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), contested the results of the election, although the
UIA eventually joined the assembly after pressure from the Shia community to
ensure their inclusion.244 Primary victory in the elections went to UIA, which
won 140 of the 275 total seats. In second place came the Kurdistan Coalition
List, made up of both Jalal Talabani’s PUK and Masoud Barazani’s KDP parties,
which won seventy-five seats.245 The liberal/secular parties, headed by Iyad
Allawi, the former interim head of government, came in at forty
representatives.246 The Sunni Arabs, due to the mass boycott, secured merely
242
243
244
245
246
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seventeen seats (six percent of the total), a sharp contrast with what is
approximated to be the total Sunni population of Iraq (29–34 percent).247 Before
progress could be made on the constitutional committee’s formation, tensions
between the frontrunners and fighting over government positions following the
elections raged for months. This in-fighting hindered addressing of the lack of
sufficient Sunni representation; unfortunately, internal debates among the
winners “derailed the effort to draw Sunni Arabs in, despite the near-universal
recognition that this was necessary for stability.”248
The constitutional committee was eventually formed on May 10, 2005, and
reflected on the make-up of the Assembly. From the outset, American officials
knew the Sunni representation needed to be addressed given the insurgency and
lack of ownership over the process by the Sunni community. Because of the
boycott, only two Arab Sunnis (from the seventeen that were elected), were
included; reports indicate that neither fully represented any Arab Sunni political
party.249 The Bush Administration made urgent appeals to the Shia and Kurds to
draw in more Sunni Arabs,250 but identifying representative leaders from the
community posed a significant hurdle, as there was no political party that
enjoyed broad support in the Sunni Arab community. A mix of initiatives and
conferences eventually provided support for the selection of fifteen additional
Sunni and civil societies, which were added to the fifty-five-member
constitutional committee on June 16, 2005.251 Efforts to sabotage the
committee’s work by insurgents went on nonetheless, as two Sunni members
were assassinated in July, most likely by extremists.252
Despite some attention to address the Sunni gap, other representational
problems were never addressed. “Only a few women were included in this
process—none of whom participated in any serious constitutional conversations;
youth representatives were also excluded.”253 That being said, the constitutional
committee, unlike the TAL, was not dominated by exiles.254
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2. Timeline of the Committee
Given the challenges of inclusion discussed above, meeting the deadline of
August 15, 2005, for the submission of a constitutional draft became one of the
most problematic aspects of the process. The goal was to have a draft by the
August date (eligible for a one-time extension), followed by a two-month public
awareness period, and ending with a national referendum on October 15.255 By
the time the process incorporated an expanded number of Arab Sunnis, and the
power struggles between the United Iraqi Alliance and Kurdistan Coalition List
were finally resolved, six months had passed.
The Iraqi constitutional members knew they had a huge task ahead of them,
and they needed to delay. First, there was a severe deficiency in trust between
all parties. Second, the participants needed to better understand the current Iraqi
system and needed to consider possible government formulations—this required
study, negotiation, and compromise,256 which in turn required time. South
Africa, for example, took seven years from start to finish to draft a
constitution.257 Iraqis, following the trauma of an invasion and now a full-blown
insurgency, had a mere two months. Initially, even the chairman of the
committee, SCIRI’s Shaikh Humam Hammoudi, asked for more time, despite
changing his position later.258
The Americans, as relayed to the Iraqis by the American Ambassador at the
time, Zalmay Khalilzad, had no intention of allowing an extension.259 Pressure
was mounting on the Bush Administration to extract itself from Iraq as quickly
as possible, and it was necessary to hold the referendum and pass the constitution
in advance of the 2006 U.S. congressional elections.260 A large portion of the
clerical establishment fell in line with U.S. desires as well, assuming that if it
did so, it would “lead to an improvement in security.”261 They were also
comfortable with the expanded role of religion that the constitutional draft
permitted.262
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In early August, the committee was officially dissolved without the ability
to see and approve a final draft.263 Senior members of the Assembly took over
the process and asked the United Nations to print millions of copies that were
distributed across the country without approval by the entirety of the National
Assembly.264 In September, Hussein al-Shahristiani of the UIA read the draft to
the National Assembly, but no opportunity was offered to that same elected
assembly to even vote on it.265
What happened at this point became a mystery to most Iraqis: the final draft
was finalized by a newly formed “leadership council.”266 The council consisted
of selected parties, including the two Kurdish parties, SCIRI, the Da’wa Party,
and the United States.267 Various participants recall the extent to which Iraqis
were uncomfortable with the pressure exerted by the United States about what
to include in the final product.268 It also became abundantly clear by mid-August
that the elected members of the National Assembly were no longer involved in
the drafting of the final document, thus severely damaged the democratic process
and alienating average Iraqis at a time when violence in Iraq was rapidly
escalating.269 The Sunni constituency—which had become sidelined in the
leadership council as well—was close to withdrawing, until they were assured
that an amendment to the constitution could be proposed within four months
upon the approval of the referendum.270 The Sunnis agreed to this, but of course
there was no appetite by the dominant parties to allow for an amendment after
the referendum. Despite the fact that very few Iraqis actually knew, much less
understood, the contents of the rushed constitution, a referendum was held on
October 15, 2005, with the leadership of both the Kurds and Shias urging
approval.271 The constitutional draft was approved by eighty percent of the
population in a manner that reflected Iraq’s ethno-sectarian communities and
their involvement: Shias and Kurds voted largely in favor, Sunnis
overwhelmingly against.272
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B. Contents

1. Preamble
Before diving into the operational parts of the constitution, from the outset,
the Preamble is striking to a reader interested in an introduction of what is to
come in modern Iraq’s founding document. Preambles, in general, can be either
legal or non-legal in nature.273 In the case of Iraq, its Preamble is non-legal in
nature, and unable to technically impose any legal obligations on Iraqis.
However, the language and tone of the Preamble still have implications on the
prioritization of selective ethnocentric groups in Iraqi society, a message
reinforced later by operational articles in the constitution.
Iraq’s Preamble employs noticeable language which signals attention to
particular cross-sections of Iraqi society while bypassing the mention of others,
thus creating a tiered victimization system.274 The Preamble offers little comfort
to a reader searching for signs that Iraqi society will successfully unite its
citizens following the trauma of brutal dictatorship and subsequent foreign
invasion. Its language is highly ethno-sectarian in nature, mentioning the “soil
the saints and companions of the Prophet [Muhammad] prayed [on]” and goes
on to remind readers of the
pains of sectarian oppression inflicted by the autocratic clique and
inspired by the tragedies of Iraq’s martyrs, Shiite and Sunni, Arabs and
Kurds and Turkmen and from all other components of the people, and
recollecting the darkness of the ravage of the holy cities and the South
in the Sha’abaniyya uprising and burnt by the flames of grief of the
mass graves . . . and articulating the sufferings of racial oppression in
the massacres of Halbcha, Barzan, Anfal, and the Fayli Kurds . . .
Turkmen in Bashir . . . and sufferings of the people of the western
region. As in the case in the remaining areas of Iraq where the people
suffered from the liquidation of their leaders, symbols, and Shaikhs
. . . .275

Although the Preamble includes a clause about how “sectarianism and racism
have not stopped us from marching together to strengthen our national unity,”
those reading the Preamble understand that particular traumas have not and will
not be forgotten. This is because the Preamble carries Iraq’s bloody past with it
into the first enshrined words of the country’s new constitution.
273
WIM VOERMANS, MAARTEN STREMLER & PAUL CLITEUR, CONSTITUTIONAL PREAMBLES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 89 (2017).
274
See id.
275
Pmbl., Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
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2. Rights & Protections & Civil Liberties
The constitution begins with one of the most contentious, as well as most
debated, articles.276 Article 2, Section 1, similar to but not exactly like the TAL,
outlines the role of Islam in Iraq.277 It states that “Islam is the official religion of
the State and is a foundation source of legislation,” adding in Section A “no law
may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of Islam.”278 The first
of these two rely on translations of the constitution made by the Americans,
which translated “tawabit ahkam” to “established provisions.”279 Arabicspeaking scholars have determined was mistranslated and instead should be read
as “established judgments.”280 Scholars argue that such a mistranslation was
pivotal. The term “established judgments” opened the door for clerical and
formal rulings to have a place in Iraq’s judicial system because that is what was
intended for the use of the word “judgments.”281 In other words, this would
guarantee that Iraqi laws would not be able to contradict Islamic judgments.
Secular negotiators argued that the use of the word “foundation” guaranteed that
Islamic sources would be given priority amongst different types of law. Other
scholars argued that such a clause would likely only be enforced as a “gap-filling
provision” in the event that Iraqi laws are silent on an issue.
In the same article, another problematic subclause appears: “No law may be
enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy.”282 This section worried
scholars who argued that such a clause would permit an entry point for religion
in the public space under the guise of a direct democracy that could possibly
harm religious minorities. Unfortunately, this was not just a theory. The
chairman of the drafting committee, Shaikh Humam Hammudi, a member of the
Shia-dominated SCIRI, wrote publicly that it is not incumbent on “the
majority. . . to consider all that is demanded by the minority; this would be the
reverse of democracy.”283 Analysis of the statements of other well-respected
Shia leaders, such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani, also reflects a similar
276
Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq’s Constitution: A Drafting History, 40 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 1, 6 (2007).
277
Article 2, Section1, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
278
Id.
279
Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Islam and the State in Iraq: The Post-2003 Constitutions, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY 614 (Ranier Grote &
Tilmann J. Roder eds., 2012).
280
Id.
281
Id. Judgments would require decision making by religious clergy to determine which laws do or don’t
violate the constitutional mandate. Id. at 607, 612.
282
Article 2, Section 1(B), Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
283
al-Istrabadi, supra note 279, at 613 (citing Humam Hamoudi, My Perceptions on the Iraqi
Constitutional Process, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (2007)).
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understanding that democracy would be interpreted as “one person, one vote.”284
However, they do not repudiate the argument that this intertwines the notion of
Iraqi democracy with Islam concretely. This is not the first time regional
religious actors display such open entanglement between the two. Concerns
about the lack of safeguards to simultaneously protect democracy and those who
do not want to live according to Islamic law is a struggle seen across the region,
and Iraq is no exception. Scholars have argued that the articles were vaguely
worded intentionally, intended to be interpreted broadly by the courts.285
Further, subsequent articles in the constitution which refer to the courts at a later
stage reinforce a system that does depend, at least partially, on reviving the
clerical involvement in lawmaking. While some legal experts argue that this
article was nothing more than a symbolic gesture to Iraq’s majority
population,286 there are clear examples that this article has been used to justify
laws consistent with Islamic law. An example of the operationalization of this
article occurred during the fight to defeat ISIS in 2016, when the Iraqi Parliament
passed a law to ban the consumption and sale of alcohol—a ban that many
minorities in Iraq protested.287 Lawmakers explicitly cited Article 2 as
justification for the law.288
Article 2, Section 1 is followed by Section 2, which technically guarantees
freedom of religion.289 However, it does so in a manner which distinguishes
Muslims from other faith communities: it guarantees Muslim rights first,
guaranteeing freedom for members of other faiths to practice without harassment
afterwards.290 Article 2 “guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority of the
Iraqi people” and thereafter guarantees the full religious rights of “all individuals
such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean Sabeans.”291 Like the TAL, this
pronouncement of some but not all of Iraq’s religions has spurred resentment
among minorities who were not named. Further, both Iraq’s Arab character as a
founding member of the Arab League, and its identity as part of the “Islamic
world,” is reinforced in Article 3, touching on long-standing sensitivities about
284
Ernesto H. Braam, All Roads Lead to Najaf: Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s Quiet Impact on Iraq’s 2010
Ballot and its Aftermath, 2 J. INT’L & GLOBAL STUD. 1, 4 (2010).
285
Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 695, 720–22 (2004) (explaining the constituent parts of Islamic law).
286
Deeks & Burton, supra note 276, at 11.
287
Samuel Osborne, Iraqi Parliament Bans Alcohol in Surprise Vote, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 23, 2016),
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/wold/middle-east/iraq-alcohol-ban-baghdad-parliament-islam-a7376216.
html.
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289
Article 2, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
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which ethnic and religious communities would be privileged and prioritized in
the new Iraq.292
There are other articles sprinkled throughout the constitution that are clearly
the result of religious party lobbying. Article 10 protects holy shrines and
religious sites in Iraq: the “State is committed to assuring and maintaining their
sanctity, and to guaranteeing the free practice of rituals in them.”293 Article 43
follows along these lines as well, guaranteeing that the “followers of all religions
and sects are free in the . . . [p]ractice of religious rites, including the Husseini
rituals.”294 These sections are a direct result of pressure coming from Shia party
members represented on the committee, given these are significant religious
monuments and rituals for those of the Shia faith.
Relatedly, Articles 41 and 42 are also a direct result of religious party
bargaining. Article 41, for the first time since Iraq’s 1925 Basic Laws, enshrines
religious personal status courts in the constitution.295 A hallmark of the Ottoman
era, these types of courts allowed different sects to go to religious leaders
(Muslim, Christian, and Jewish) for matters pertaining to divorce, marriage,
child custody, inheritance, and alimony.296 At the time, the thinking was that
these were matters outside of the purview of the state, which shouldn’t interfere
in such personal affairs.297 The 1958 Provisional Constitution was silent on the
issue of personal status courts (although they continued to exist) as the state
would issue laws tangentially related to the issues covered by the personal status
courts (age of marriage for women was increased to eighteen, for example).298
The TAL made no mention of personal status laws or religious courts.299 The
insertion of them here, therefore, was undoubtedly deliberate, and was part of a
concerted effort to weaken the civil judiciary more generally, an issue to be
discussed below in the power-sharing section.300
Finally, it is important to mention a positive feature of the constitution built
along ethnic lines,: the protection provided for speaking native languages, a
concept introduced in the TAL and enshrined in the constitution. Articles 4,
Sections 1 declares that “Arabic language and the Kurdish language are the two
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

Id. art. 3.
Id. art. 10.
Id. art. 43.
Id. art. 41; al-Istrabadi, supra note 279, at 626.
al-Istrabadi, supra note 279, at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 626–27.
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official languages of Iraq” and announce “the right of Iraqis to educate their
children in their mother tongue, such as Turkmen, Assyrian, and Armenian shall
be guaranteed in government educational institutions.”301 Further, Article 4,
Section 4 guarantees Turkmen and Syriacs to include their languages as official
languages in the administrative units where they “constitute density of
population.”302 Finally, Article 4(5) permits each region or governorate to adopt
any local language as an additional language if the majority of the population
votes to do so in a general referendum.303 On a similar note, the constitution later
guarantees that the local administrations would also protect the “administrative,
political, culture, and educational rights of the various nationalities, such as
Turkomen, Chaldeans, Assyrians.”304
Finally, as mentioned and elaborated on above, de-Baathification was a
common, contentious theme in both the TAL and the 2005 Constitution. DeBaathification was reinforced in constitutional Articles 7(1), 135, and 138(3)(C)
and (D).305 While the initial draft stated that “[a]ny thinking that adopts
radicalism, terrorism, taqfir . . ., or incites, glorifies, initiates or promotes thereto,
especially the Saddamist Ba’ath, shall be prohibited in thought and in practice,”
by late August, the “leadership council” including Kurdish, secular Shia, and
Sunni negotiators, removed reference to “thought” after much Sunni
objection.306 Further, initial attempts to include the word “Baath Party” were
also repudiated, given that many civil servants had a superficial relationship to
the Party in Saddam’s Iraq, instead resulting in reference only to “Saddamist
Baath.”307 Article 7(1)’s final language reads as follows: “Any entity or program
that adopts, incites, facilitates, glorifies, promotes, or justifies racism or
terrorism or accusations of being an infidel (takfir) or ethnic cleansing,
especially the Saddamist Ba’ath in Iraq and its symbols, under any name
whatsoever, shall be prohibited.”308

3. Power Sharing
While the first and second sections of the constitution are concerned with
basic principles and freedoms, Sections 3, 4, and 5 focus on delineating the
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

added).

Article 4, Section 1, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
Id. art. 4(4).
Id. art. 4(5).
Id. art. 125.
Id. arts. 7, 135, 138.
Deeks & Burton, supra note 276, at 25 (emphasis added).
Id. at 25, 29.
Article 7(1), Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005 (emphasis
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powers of the legislature, executive, and judiciary as well as the federal,
provincial, and regional governments.309
Most of the controversial issues of the constitution are focused on articles
pertaining to power sharing between the central, regional, and provincial
governments. However, there were also debates surrounding the powers of the
individual branches of government as groups scrambled to maximize their
ability to seize more control.
a. Judiciary
One of the most important debates concerned who was eligible to become a
judge.310 Initially, the Constitutional Court’s nine members were determined to
be “Sharia canonists, law professors, and lawyers with at least twenty years of
experience, nominated by the Council of Ministers, and also approved by a twothirds vote of the [Council of Representatives].”311 By mid-August, it was clear
that there were tensions between the religious parties and secularists who
debated over the use of the words “Shari’a canonists,” and whether they would
be used to exclude judges and lawyers trained in Iraqi civil law, but not religious
Shari’a law.312 Secular pushback paved the way for only slightly compromised
wording; Article 92(2) instead states “the Federal Supreme Court shall be made
up of a number of judges, experts in Islamic jurisprudence, and legal scholars,
whose number, the method of their selection and the work of the Court shall be
determined by a law . . . .”313 In this way, the inclusion of the word “experts”
opened the door for non-traditional legal experts with religious qualifications.314
The judiciary would now be a branch of government that did not solely include
civil servants, but would also facilitate the formal entry of Shia clerics into a
branch of government.315
b. Legislature
The Iraqi system, a parliamentary system, was technically designed to be a
bicameral one, consisting of a Council of Representatives and a Federation
Council. Whereas the Council of Representatives was to be elected directly by
309

Id. arts. 1, 2.
Deeks & Burton, supra note 276, at 45.
311
Id. at 50.
312
Id. at 52.
313
Article 92, Section 2, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005
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the people at a ratio of one seat per 100,000 Iraqis,316 the Federation Council
would include representatives from the regions and governorates,317 and is
mentioned in one article in the constitution but was meant to be further
delineated in laws outside of the constitution.318 Unfortunately, a Federation
Council was never actually created. The purpose of the Federation Council was
to enable the formation of a more structured, decentralized system by inducting
into the legislative branch representatives chosen directly from each region and
governorate to represent their constituents.319 However, competition between
those in Baghdad (who fought for increased central power) and those in regions
and governorates outside of Baghdad (like the KRG, who were fighting for
increased local power) left the two in a power struggle that—until today—
continues to hinder the creation of decentralized institutions, even those initially
conceived to come to fruition in the constitution.
c. Central vs. Local Power
The real power sharing struggle unfolded in debates concerning Section 4,
where the powers of the federal government as well as the regions are
enshrined.320 Recall that the Kurdish leaders did not achieve the goals they set
out to achieve in the TAL; in the 2005 Constitution, they remained firm about
realizing their demands.
A reading of this section reveals a glaring issue: the constitution creates a
very tense (and sometimes vague) understanding of who is entitled to create
regions. The parties did not share a vision about whether this would be a
federalist system, local units of power coming together, or a decentralized
system where power emanated from the central government with allocation to
local units. Further, there was confusion amongst committee members because
316
317

Article 49, Section 1, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
Members of the Council of Representatives are elected by proportional representation with
semi-open list balloting. A new electoral law in 2013 increased the size of the Council from
325 members to 328 members (formerly 310 seats from party lists in each governorate and
7 national compensatory seats). Under the new system, 320 seats are apportioned among 18
governorates and 8 are reserved to minority groups (Christian (5), Sabean (1), Shabak (1),
and Yizidi (1)) in specific governorates. Constitutionally, the membership of the Council is
to seek to achieve at least 25% (82 seats) representation of women. Each list must have 1
female candidate after each 3 male candidates.

See Republic of Iraq, Election Guide: Democracy Assistance & Election News, ELECTIONGUIDE (Dec. 14, 2020),
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Article 65, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
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Kamal Chomani, Iraq’s Missing Federation Council, TAHRIR INST. MIDDLE E. POL’Y (Nov. 8, 2018),
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in many instances, the creation of regions was envisioned to be asymmetrical to
accommodate the KRG. However, at one point, there were conversations that
the Shia SCIRI was pushing for the creation of a nine-governorate Shia “superregion” that would be close to Iran.321 Although one in six Iraqis at the time,
both Shia and Sunni, refused federation of the rest of Iraq (outside of Kurdish
areas), the constitution’s language opened the door for the future creation of
additional regions, with the exception of Baghdad and Kirkuk, which—as
explained above for the TAL—would not be permitted to join any region.322
The constitution then outlines the federal government’s limited rights and
responsibilities: formulating foreign policy and diplomatic representations;
executing national security policy, including the armed forces, fiscal and
customs policy and creating the national budget; regulating citizenship and
immigration, broadcast frequencies and mail, and water resource policy that
concerns water coming into Iraq from the outside, as well as census statistics.323
Additionally, the federal government is allowed to manage oil and gas extracted
from present (not future) fields.324 The federal government may distribute this
oil throughout the country based on population, specifying a portion for a
specific period for regions unjustly deprived of such resources during the
Saddam era.325 This mostly speaks to the gross negligence of the Saddam era
which deprived Kurds of their oil resources.326 The KRG was also adamant
about ensuring it would be able to control foreign contracts with oil companies
for oil wells within its territory without central government interference.327
The federal and regional governments are then asked to share the following
areas of authority, knowing that power struggles between the two are meant to
prefer regional control: managing customs; regulating electric energy; and
formulating environmental, development, health, educational, and water
resource policy.328 Article 115 states clearly that all powers not within the
exclusive competency of the federal government belong to the regions and

321

al-Istrabadi, supra note 149, at 1631; Deeks & Burton, supra note 276, at 81.
al-Istrabadi, supra note 149, at 1631.
323
Article 110, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
324
Id. art. 112. This was a deliberate omission pushed for by the Kurdish parties, who had unopened oil
fields, the profits of which they didn’t want to have to divide up with the rest of Iraq. Deeks & Burton, supra
note 276, at 55. Similarly, although to a lesser extent, some of the Shia blocs also pushed for this given that there
were some unopened oil wells in Shia-dominated governorates as well. Id.
325
Article 112, Section 1, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
326
Deeks & Burton, supra note 276, at 55.
327
Id.
328
Article 114, Dustūr Jumh. ūrīyat al-’Irāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
322

QADDOUR_7.11.22

2022]

7/11/2022 9:49 AM

IRAQ’S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS

279

governorates.329 Article 121(2) adds that regions can amend application of
federal laws if the matter is not solely within the authority of the federal
government.330
The constitution then delineates the articulated powers of the region. This is
where it becomes complicated. From the outset, the KRG, true to what was
promised since 1974, is enshrined as a region in the 2005 Constitution.331 The
constitution allows one or more governorates to create regions, so long as they
conduct a referendum submitted by one-third of the council members in each
governate or by one-tenth of voters in each of the governorates.332 The
constitution then permits regions to create structures within the regions, and
gives them the power to amend the application of any national legislation as long
as it doesn’t fall into areas marked as solely belonging to the federal
government.333 This particular section of the constitution alarmed Sunnis who,
being a minority, feared the creation of a Shia region created from several Shiamajority provinces, resulting in Sunnis being sidelined by both a KRG and a
Shia region.334
Pivotally, the constitution permits the establishment of an internal security
force, such as police or guards, in any region.335 This has directly justified the
creation of the Peshmerga, a security force which falls under the command of
the Ministry of the Peshmerga in the KRG, which is divided between the
authorities of both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (led by Barzani in western
KRG and influenced by Turkey) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (led by
Talabani in eastern KRG and influenced by Iran).336 It has also allowed for the
creation of two other security forces: the Shia dominated Popular Mobilization
Forces and the Iraqi Security Forces.337 The lack of coordination and control of
forces by the central government has led to a series of serious security breaches
which allowed ISIS to create cells in disputed territories where security forces
have refused to coordinate (the KRG and Popular Mobilization Forces refused

329
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to coordinate at various points during the fight against ISIS, for example).338 The
idea of multiple security forces—established out of lack of trust in groups
following massacres that took place in the Saddam era—has set up a security
system in Iraq with four different centers, all armed, and all concerned with
separate spheres of influence.339 As a result, militia leaders have grown in
strength and influence, and many now serve as members in the National
Assembly,340 even those with a record of executing documented, sectarian
crimes.341
Finally, Article 121(4) of the 2005 Constitution permits regions and
governorates to open offices in embassies and launch diplomatic missions.342 In
practical terms, this has created tensions in foreign countries where the KRG has
independent offices, issues its own visas, announces separate official messages,
and employs entirely separate staff from the Iraqi Embassy.
d. Unwritten Ethno-Sectarianism
Arguably, the most interesting part of the Iraqi system is what is not written
in the 2005 Constitution, particularly regarding the President’s ethnicity and
sect. The Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 1964 had articulated that the President
must be Muslim,343 but this requirement was not included in the 1970
Constitution, the TAL, or 2005 Constitution. Nonetheless, a tradition arose
following the January 2005 elections that has been followed as if it is black letter
law.
According to Ambassador Feisal al-Istrabadi, one of the drafters of the TAL,
Adnan Pachachi, who served in the Iraqi Governing Council, pushed for the
appointment of the first non-Arab leader of Iraq, Jalal Talabani, to become head
of state.344 It is recalled that Pachachi stated, “we have to break the notion that
the presidency belongs to the Arab Sunnis.”345 According to al-Istrabadi, there
338
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was no pushback on Talabani’s appointment and the precedent that it might set.
Scholars, such as Zaid Al-Ali, acknowledge that while this particular story is
unknown to them, there was never any doubt that the Shias were going to win
the premiership—the most powerful position—and thus they would always be
ensured the position of Prime Minister. The other two posts, President and
Speaker of Parliament, would have been delegated to the other two stakeholders.
Of those two, the presidency was arguably more important and the Kurds, being
the more powerful of the two, took the presidency.346 The Sunnis were left with
the Speaker of the Parliament. Since 2005, the delegation of these posts along
ethnic and sectarian lines has not changed. This tradition is arguably more
problematic than some of the penned articles: if the article was written, at least
it could be amended. But how can one amend a custom that is not even written
into law?
CONCLUSION
Reflecting on Iraq’s history and constitutional process, one can safely
conclude that sectarianism did not begin with the 2003 invasion, as traumatic of
an episode as that was in Iraq’s history. The origins of societal divisions are
rooted in Iraq’s past, particularly its Ottoman past, that instituted a hierarchy
prioritizing Muslims over non-Muslims as a matter of policy for hundreds of
years. The European powers that stepped in to push the dying Empire to impose
quotas and institutionalize non-Muslims in governance—an opportunity they
had limited access to before—ultimately forced minorities to maintain their
ethnic and sectarian cloaks. Without it, it can be argued, they might not have
survived, much less participated in the governance of their communities. The
most critical role the invasion played was to provide a path for ethnosectarianism to be institutionalized in the current constitutional framework,
exacerbating already-existing historical tensions, even if they remained under
the surface.
In response to this grim reality, some scholars have argued that Iraq is better
off to embrace its sectarianism, to accept that its communities have zealous
religious tendencies, and that by doing so, the state is protecting “diversity” and
surrendering to what Iraq actually is.347 Scholars like Noah Feldman and Stephen
Townley argue that establishment of religion is a necessary prerequisite in state
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and nation-building projects in the Middle East.348 Townley, in particular, relies
on James Madison to justify the establishment of religion in Iraq because it
“encourag[es] a multiplicity of mutually balancing sects, all competing for
adherents and defining themselves in relation to each other, thus achieving a
creative equilibrium.”349 But this quote cannot reasonably apply to a context
where there is no set, unifying identity, as in Iraq, and one where each group
perceives the situation as a zero-sum game, where the survival and thriving of
one community threatens the survival and future of another. The benign, open
marketplace of ideas that Townley paints—that he claims would foster a more
responsive government in Iraq—is not a realistic outcome in the Iraqi context.
Townley argues that when a “government cooperates with belief associations”
it begets tolerance.350 He argues that there should be an embrace of religion in
governance.351 He hones in on supposed benefits of Islamic courts for Muslim
women, which he believes are better for Muslim women because Islamic courts
will have to compete with secular courts to attract their “business.”352 He also
asserts that the threat of a Muslim woman possibly “exiting” this system and
turning to the secular system to settle her dispute is powerful enough to
incentivize evolution in the court system to favor women.353
But there is no indication that personal status courts in Iraq, or in other
countries in the region where they still exist, are more favorable to women in
their judicial holdings or that they pander to them to gain their approval to
maintain existence. Even today, countries attempting to impose egalitarian
inheritance schemes, such as Tunisia, are unable to do so precisely because the
bulk of personal status courts and schools remain wedded to orthodox Islamic
rulings, notwithstanding the fact that by imposing those schemes, women (and
other cross-sections of society) will continue to seek restitution elsewhere if such
an outlet exists.354 Thus, the idea that operationalizing religious articles in the
constitution and embracing religion in the public space is the key to the evolution
of Iraqi society towards liberalism, is unfounded. The competition among
religious groups does indeed exist, but it is almost exclusively used as a
galvanizing tool to exploit societal wedges to prevent unity among Iraqis, and in
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fact spur illiberalism in the country. Groups are financially supported (and
rewarded) by members of parliament, local leaders, and foreign countries to
maintain their distinct identity. Security is also provided based on community
affiliation. Advocating for national unity across Iraq’s many groupings
jeopardizes access to such benefits because—by and large—access to resources
and security has become a winner(s)-take(s)-all phenomenon given to loyal
group members.
Whether liberal democracy in highly fragmented societies can succeed is
debated among scholars. The United States remains almost an anomaly, in that
it is one of the only states with a highly diverse population, not unified in sect
or religion, that is held together by constitutionalism.355 In the cases where
dominant nationalities do not exist, such as Switzerland or Belgium, a federal
system steps in to break down the federation by ethnicity and/or linguistic group,
drawing lines that align closely with where such groups are located
geographically. Most European countries, in fact, usually have one dominant
nationality with much smaller minority groups.356 In the case of Iraq’s highly
fragmented society, federalism and/or de-centralization has not been properly
enforced and designed in good will, and attempts to partition have failed.357 Even
the most powerful brokers in Iraq—the Shia and their strong militias—failed to
partition the state from the rest of Iraq, despite arguably having the power to do
so. To enable this, they would have needed to figure out how to properly run
Iraq in a way that ensures stability, security, and welfare, and eliminates
widespread corruption and mismanagement. In this case, it can be safely argued
that partition—at least alone—would not have healed Iraq’s many ills.
Iraq’s many constitutional processes involved largely undemocratic actors
in what was meant to (theoretically) culminate in a liberal democracy in 2005.
But such systems cannot be created by illiberal, undemocratic actors. At the
same time, they cannot be imposed inorganically by outside forces. What the
Iraqi situation reflects is that external liberal actors—who believed themselves
to know “better” than local Iraqis—failed just as much as, if not more than, the
local actors to bring about a liberal, democratic Iraq. Undemocratic forces will
355
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always lead back to a monopoly on power; the only question is which branch of
government will end up with that monopoly. While Saddam’s system suffered
from hyper-executive power, the pendulum swung fully towards a hyperparliamentary system after the invasion of Iraq—in both cases preventing the
creation of checks and balances that would have been pivotal to power
dispersion across the state. But at the heart of this is also the purpose of the state:
when such systems were created, they were not created with the individual, and
his or her ability to thrive, in mind. As a result, inclusivity of the public is ignored
(as we saw in the processes above), and stability becomes the primary goal. On
the other hand, employing inclusivity and consulting with the public for
manipulative purposes, such as to give an undemocratic process a false veneer
of legitimacy, is also deceiving. Neither of these scenarios leads to the end goal
of a democratic, inclusive Iraq.
It is important to end with a clear acknowledgment that despite the
undercurrent of now-institutionalized ethno-sectarian discrimination, Iraq’s
downfall is intertwined with problems that plague many counties, especially
those with conflicts or in the post-conflict phase. Iraqi politicians’ insatiable
greed and desire to maintain power at all costs will continue to cripple Iraq’s
ability to pry itself out of its dysfunction. According to Transparency
International, Iraq ranks 160 out of 180 countries on its corruption index.358 The
bargaining that took place during the drafting of the constitution, as articulated
above, was between political powers that more or less have maintained their firm
grip on Iraq’s institutions as well as its precious, valuable resources since 2003.
Their design of the Iraqi State has aided them in their efforts to exploit resources
and positions of authority: vague language has been weaponized to maintain lack
of transparency, and where the constitution has been inconvenient to apply, it
has been ignored (i.e., the existence of multiple armed groups). Reformers that
have entered the scene, and whistleblowers and activists that have attempted to
highlight abuses of politicians and militias, have become victims to kidnapping,
detention, or even worse—assassination.359
While it was inspiring to watch Iraq’s protests unfold in October 2019, yet
again, there is little reason to believe such revolts alone will push Iraq in the
direction of liberal democracy. So long as its society remains fixated (and
incentivized) to maintain its historical cleavages and there is no serious
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contemplation of re-imagining federalism and decentralization, Iraq will remain
rooted in despair. Most importantly, so long as ineffective politicians continue
to serve their personal financial interests and insist on maintaining power, and
Iraqis insist on a zero-sum game paradigm as the key to their survival, the current
constitution will be either selectively ignored or used to oppress Iraq’s
population instead of being used as a consensus document providing a pathway
to a more fruitful future.

